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ABSTRACT: 
Past return-based strategies, such as reversal and momentum, have been widely discussed in 
academic papers. In reversal strategies, such as long-term return reversal which was first pre-
sented by De Bondt and Thaler (1985), past stock price movements in one direction are expected 
to reverse to opposite direction in the future. Instead of focusing only on simple long-term re-
turn reversals, the purpose of this study is to examine whether fundamental strength-based 
sorting can enhance the performance of the long-term reversal strategy. Firms’ fundamental 
strength is measured with Piotroski’s (2000) FSCORE, which consists of nine variables measuring 
firms’ profitability, leverage/liquidity, and operational efficiency. This study is motivated by the 
expectation errors framework presented by Piotroski and So (2012), who find that 
value/growth-strategy’s returns are concentrated in portfolios with incongruent expectations 
implied by firms’ FSCORE and book-to-market multiples. This study combines FSCORE with past 
return performance instead of pricing multiples. The hypothesis is, that reversals are strongest 
with high (low) fundamental strength stocks with the lowest (highest) past return performance. 
 
The portfolios are formed by double sorting. First, the stocks are sorted to non-overlapping quar-
tile portfolios based on the past 36 months returns, with ranking and holding periods being three 
years. Thereafter the winner and loser quartiles are sorted to high and low fundamental portfo-
lios based on firms’ individual FSCORE-values. The returns for each three-year fundamental re-
versal portfolios are calculated as value-weighted compound returns. Traditionally equal-
weighted returns have been used widely in empirical finance, but value-weighted returns are 
used here to have more credible results, as suggested by Hou, Xue and Zhang (2018). Risk-ad-
justed return performance of the strategies is measured using Sharpe (1966) and Sortino (1994) 
ratios. It is also examined, whether the returns of the fundamental reversal strategies are ex-
plained by the common risk factors of Fama and French (2018) three-, five-, and six-factor mod-
els. 
 
As hypothesized, long-term past losers with high fundamental strength have stronger reversals 
than past losers with low fundamental strength. On the other hand, similar return reversals are 
not observed with past winners. FSCORE-based fundamental analysis can help to enhance future 
risk-adjusted returns, as past winners and losers with high fundamental strength have better 
risk-adjusted performance than the low fundamental counterparts. The returns of the funda-
mental reversal strategies are explained by the common risk factors, when the three-factor 
model is augmented with investment and profitability factors. In factor loading level, past losers 
are characterized as having conservative capital expenditures, whereas past winners tend to 
have aggressive capital expenditures. The results of the study are affected by survivorship bias, 
as the data includes only the stocks included in the S&P 1500 index at the time of collecting the 
data.     
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1 Introduction 
Investment strategies based on past returns of stocks, such as reversal and momentum, 
have been widely discussed in past academic studies. In its basic form the discussion of 
past return-based phenomena focuses on efficient market hypothesis (Fama, 1970), and 
whether these strategies go against the weak form of the hypothesis or whether these 
phenomena are explained by the common risk factors. In reversal, also known as con-
trarian strategies, past stock price movements in one direction are expected to reverse 
to the opposite direction in a certain time period. The phenomenon of long-term stock 
price reversals was presented by De Bondt and Thaler (1985), who suggest that stocks 
with worst past returns outperform stocks with highest past returns with approximately 
25% in the subsequent three years. In their study the stocks with the poorest past return 
performance are called “losers”, whereas the stocks with the best past long-term perfor-
mance are called “winners”. Similar reversals are also found on short-term monthly pe-
riods (Jegadeesh, 1990), but the focus of this study is in long-term reversals. 
 
In this paper the long-term reversal strategy is understood as a contrarian strategy which 
focuses solely on past long-term returns of securities. In the wider perspective, similar 
stock characteristics can be captured with other contrarian strategies such as value strat-
egies, where the goal is to find undervalued value stocks and overvalued glamour stocks 
by using pricing multiples, such as price-to-book and price-to-earnings. Whether using 
simply past returns or accounting multiples, the behavioral explanation for these anom-
alies is suggested to be related to investors’ overreaction, which drives the stock prices 
to non-rational levels and thus drives these contrarian strategies to outperform the mar-
ket. (Lakonishok, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1994) Opposite to behavioral explanations, long-
term reversals have been explained by risk-based theories. For instance, Fama and 
French (1996) are able to explain long-term return reversals with the three-factor asset 
pricing model. Moreover, Yaqiong (2012) questions the whole phenomenon of long-term 
reversals, as the return reversals are reported to occur only during the month of January.  
 
7 
Instead of focusing only on simple long-term reversal strategies, this study examines the 
role of fundamental strength in long-term reversals, and whether fundamental strength-
based sorts can enhance the performance of the return reversal strategies. Firms’ fun-
damental strength is measured with Piotroski’s (2000) FSCORE. FSCORE is an accounting-
based aggregate score, which classifies each firm based on their fundamental strength. 
Based on nine signals, FSCORE measures firms’ profitability, change in financial lever-
age/liquidity and change in operational efficiency. Originally, Piotroski (2000) uses 
FSCORE to enhance the returns of a value strategy which buys high book-to-market value 
stocks. Later Piotroski and So (2012) suggest that value/glamour strategy’s returns are 
highest with the stocks that have incongruent expectations implied by FSCORE and book-
to-market multiple. Those findings are suggested to be due to investors’ systematic ex-
pectation errors. 
 
In this study the expectation errors are hypothesised to be found by using only past long-
term returns instead of pricing multiples. As FSCORE has shown ability to enhance the 
returns of various investment strategies, it is interesting to see whether it can sort the 
future winners out of past loser stocks and future losers out of past winners simply by 
using past returns instead of pricing multiples. To the writer’s best knowledge, empirical 
tests combining firms’ fundamental strength and long-term return reversals have not 
been done in the past. To decrease the role of microcap stocks, and to better capture 
the investors’ wealth effect as suggested by Fama (1998), the portfolios formed in this 
study are value-weighted. As shown by Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2018), portfolio weighting 
can influence the returns of various anomalies, and replacing equal-weighting with 
value-weighting can make the empirical results more credible. 
 
 
1.1 Previous studies 
After the publication of the original study by De Bondt and Thaler (1985), long-term re-
turn reversals and investor behavior-related explanation for the anomaly have been ex-
amined and challenged in various papers. Opposite to overreaction hypothesis, the 
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phenomenon is linked to seasonality and firm size, as studies show that it is focused on 
small firms in the month of January, whereas outside January the reversal returns disap-
pear. (Zarowin, 1990; Yaqiong, 2012) Also, Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004) and George 
and Hwang (2007) link long-term reversal to stock market seasonality and suggest that 
locked-in capital gains and tax loss selling are the main drivers for loser stock reversals. 
By using the three-factor model, Fama and French (1996) explain the returns of long-
term reversals with positive size and value factors, meaning that past long-term losers 
are riskier due to smaller firm size and higher financial distress. Garcia-Feijoo and Jensen 
(2014) add, that monetary conditions play an important role in explaining the reversals. 
Opposing results have been found from international markets, as Wu, Li, and Hamill 
(2012) find that low and middle priced past losers gain significant abnormal returns in 
U.K stock markets after adjusting to common risk factors of the three-factor model, with 
the results generally supporting the overreaction hypothesis. Similarly, the evidence by 
Galariotis (2012) in French stock markets is supportive of overreaction hypothesis. 
 
Piotroski and So (2012) find, that combining another type of contrarian strategy, book-
to-market ratio-based value strategy, with FSCORE-based fundamental strength sorting 
enhances significantly the performance of the value strategy of buying high book-to-
market stocks and selling low book-to-market stocks. Piotroski and So (2012) and 
Walkshäusl (2017) link this phenomenon to investors’ expectation errors, as the 
value/glamour returns are statistically and economically significant with firms where ex-
pectations implied by current fundamental strength and book-to-market ratios are in-
congruent. Tikkanen and Äijö (2018) test the FSCORE-based sorting with several value 
strategies and find that the FSCORE enhances the performance of all the value strategies 
analyzed in the study. In addition to value strategies, FSCORE is also able to enhance the 
returns of other strategies, such as momentum (Chen, Lee, & Shih, 2016; Turtle & Wang, 
2017; Ahmed & Safdar, 2018; Walkshäusl, 2019) and short-term reversal strategies (Zhu, 
Sun, & Chen, 2019). 
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1.2 Purpose of the study and intended contribution 
Previous studies of return reversal strategies focus mainly on past returns, and funda-
mentals of the firms do not gain attention. The purpose of this study is to measure the 
impact of fundamental analysis in the form of FSCORE on the long-term return reversal 
strategy. As a comprehensive metric of firms’ profitability, leverage/liquidity and operat-
ing efficiency, FSCORE is chosen as the measure of firms’ fundamental strength. Whereas 
Piotroski (2000) and Piotroski and So (2012) combine FSCORE and book-to-market to 
sort firms into portfolios, here the portfolios are simply double sorted with FSCORE and 
past compounded returns. Moreover, past long-term returns can possibly work as a sim-
ilar proxy of expectation errors as book-to-market and other pricing multiples used in 
the previous studies. 
 
Intended contribution of this study is to find, whether fundamental analysis can enhance 
the performance of the long-term reversal strategy. Following the expectation errors 
framework, it is interesting to see whether high fundamental strength (high FSCORE) 
companies with poor past returns outperform companies with low FSCORE and poor 
past performance. Similarly, the study can show whether low fundamental strength win-
ners perform worse than high fundamental winners. Motivating results are found by Zhu 
et al. (2019) with short-term return reversals, as they find that a strategy that buys past 
one-month losers with strong fundamentals and sells past winners with weak fundamen-
tals outperforms other short-term reversal strategies examined in the study. In addition, 
as it is apparent that January returns play a role in simple long-term reversals, it is inter-
esting to see how fundamental strength-based sorting affects the role of January returns 
in the long-term reversal strategy. 
 
 
1.3 Research hypotheses 
The first hypothesis of the study is built around the expectation errors framework of 
Piotroski and So (2012), which is also tested by Walkshäusl (2017) in European stock 
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markets. These studies conclude that the future revisions are concentrated on firms 
which have incongruent expectations between current pricing multiples and fundamen-
tal strength.  As mentioned, here long-term past return performance of stocks is ex-
pected to mimic the expectations implied by book-to-market ratio. The expectations for 
this study, adapted from the expectation errors framework by Piotroski and So (2012) 
are presented in the following table: 
 
Table 1. Expectations framework. 
 
 
Highest long-term past 
returns 
Mediocre past re-
turns 
Lowest long-term past re-
turns 
Low FSCORE Incongruent expectations Ambiguous Congruent expectations 
Middle FSCORE Ambiguous 
Congruent expec-
tations 
Ambiguous 
High FSCORE Congruent expectations Ambiguous Incongruent expectations 
 
Interpreting Table 1, the strongest reversals are expected to occur in the upper-left and 
bottom-right corners of the matrix, which have incongruent expectations implied by past 
long-term returns and fundamental strength. The middle portfolios with ambiguous ex-
pectations are not examined in this study. Similar ground for the hypothesis is provided 
by Zhu et al. (2019) in short-term monthly return reversals, as they find that monthly 
return reversals are higher with past losers (winners) that have strong (weak) fundamen-
tals. Moreover, Ahmed and Safdar (2018) and Walkshäusl (2019) find reversals in mo-
mentum returns with firms that have incongruent past performance and fundamental 
strength. Following the findings from previous studies, the first hypothesis for this study 
is the following: 
 
H1: Firms with incongruent past long-term returns and fundamental strength are ex-
pected to have stronger long-term reversals than firms with congruent past returns and 
fundamental strength.  
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The second hypothesis tests how the strategies fare against the common risk factors. In 
specific, strategies are tested with the common risk factors of Fama and French (2018) 
three- , five-, and six-factor models. If the hypothesis holds, the returns are explained by 
known risk factors, and the fundamental strength-adjusted long-term reversal strategies 
do not gain abnormal returns. The hypothesis is motivated by Fama and French (1996), 
who explain the unconditional long-term return reversals with the three-factor model. 
In the second hypothesis, the FSCORE sorted reversal strategies are called the funda-
mental long-term reversal strategies. The second hypothesis is the following: 
 
H2: Returns of the fundamental long-term reversal strategies are explained by common 
risk factors. 
 
 
1.4 Limitations  
The returns of the portfolios examined in this study are affected by survivorship bias, as 
this study includes only the stocks that were included in the S&P 1500 index at the time 
of collecting the data. This can create upward bias to the returns of the portfolios, as 
stocks that have been delisted from the index due to reasons such as financial distress 
and acquisitions are not considered in the portfolio formation. In long-term return re-
versal studies, survivorship bias is reported to decrease the sample size by 10 to 20 per-
cent, in cases where portfolios are formed only of stocks that have available returns for 
the whole three-year holding period (Loughran & Ritter, 1996; Kothari & Warner, 1997). 
In this study the character of survivorship bias is different, as the effect is increasing to-
wards the older portfolios as the dropouts are not considered.  
 
One consequence of including only the stocks that were included in the index at the time 
of collecting the data is that the analysis is limited to quartile past-return portfolios. This 
is due to reason that some of the portfolios would become unreliably small with more 
extreme portfolio formations. In addition, this study does not consider trading costs and 
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taxes, which is not highly problematic as portfolio turnover is low, and thus the strategies 
included require infrequent trading due to long holding periods. 
 
 
1.5 Structure of the study 
This paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents the theoretical background related 
to the subject of the paper, by reviewing the theories regarding market efficiency and 
common asset pricing models. In Chapter 3, the phenomenon of long-term return rever-
sals is reviewed, which is followed by the review of studies about fundamental strength, 
with the focus on studies regarding FSCORE and similar metrics. Chapter 4 presents the 
data and methodology used in this study. In Chapter 5 the results of the study are re-
ported and analyzed, and Chapter 6 concludes the paper.  
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2 Theoretical background 
This chapter reviews the theories and models which are related to the subject of the 
paper. First, the theory of market efficiency is reviewed in Chapter 2.1. Thereafter the 
main asset pricing models are presented in Chapters 2.2-2.6.  
 
 
2.1 Market efficiency 
According to Fama (1970, p. 383), capital market’s main function is to allocate the own-
ership of the capital stock in the economy. In the efficient markets, security prices con-
tain all available information enabling firms and investors to make decisions on resource 
allocation with accurate signals of prices. The discussion of market efficiency is im-
portant for this paper, as it analyzes investment strategy based on the past return per-
formance and available financial statement information of stocks, which should be re-
flected by the prices.  
 
The efficient market hypothesis can be separated to three levels based on the form of 
market efficiency, which are weak, semi-strong, and strong form. The weak and semi-
strong forms are closely related to the subject of this paper. In weak form of market 
efficiency, information subset is the past returns of securities. When the weak form of 
market efficiency holds, investors cannot use historical return information to make prof-
itable future trades. In the more restrictive semi-strong form of market efficiency, secu-
rity prices reflect all publicly available information, for instance annual earnings an-
nouncements. In the most restrictive form of market efficiency, strong form, all available 
information is reflected in prices. That means that even private information that is not 
accessed by all market participants, such as corporate insiders’ information, would be 
reflected in the prices. (Fama, 1970) Fama (1970, p. 415) concludes, that weak and semi-
strong forms of market efficiency are strongly supported, whereas strong form is sug-
gested to be a benchmark for analyzing possible inefficiencies in markets. 
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In a re-evaluation study, Fama (1991) addresses that many anomalies have emerged in 
the academic literature since the original publication of the efficient market hypothesis, 
and that the strongest version of market efficiency is false due to information and trading 
costs. The original hypothesis suggests that the costs of trading and information are al-
ways zero. In a more economically robust, although weaker form of efficiency, the profits 
of exploiting information do not exceed the costs of information and the arbitrage trad-
ing that is needed to exploit the inefficiencies (Jensen, 1978). Also, Fama (1991) argues 
that the true level of market efficiency can be impossible to infer precisely due to joint-
hypothesis problem, which means that the market efficiency needs to be tested together 
with an asset-pricing model. This creates a situation, where it is ambiguous to separate 
whether abnormal returns are due to market inefficiency or due to a bad-model problem.  
 
Fama (1998) further addresses the issues with unavoidable bad-model problem when 
analyzing anomalies which are based on long-term returns. Fama (1998, p. 285) argues, 
that all models that seek to describe average returns have problems, but that the bad-
model problems are more serious in longer time horizons. The reason behind is that the 
volatility of the returns does not grow as fast with the return horizon as the model’s 
errors with expected returns. Also, many anomalies are seen fragile, as changes to the 
methodology of the certain model can cause abnormal returns to disappear, which is a 
strong indication that the anomaly does not provide evidence against market efficiency. 
Fragility of many anomalies is later supported by Hou et al. (2018), who replicate a wide 
section of 452 anomalies in their study. They find that after controlling for micro-caps 
and using value-weighted returns instead of equal-weighted returns, most of the anom-
alies do not replicate properly and thus are not robust. To gain more credible results, this 
paper uses value-weighted returns.  
 
Opposed to the efficient market hypothesis, investor behavior-based models have 
emerged, which base their hypotheses on psychological evidence and models (Barberis, 
Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998; Daniel, Hirshleifer, & Subrahmanyam, 1998). The behavior-
based models are also important for this paper, as long-term return reversals have a 
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significant role in them. Barberis et al. (1998) present investor sentiment-based model, 
which is based on investor overreaction and underreaction. In their model, sophisticated 
investors gain abnormal returns by exploiting investor sentiment. The model proposes 
that investors give too much attention to the strength of new information such as earn-
ings announcements, and simultaneously not enough attention for information’s statis-
tical weight. In their model, investors systematically underreact to news announcements 
in a short time horizon up to one year. This systematical underreaction leads to slow 
incorporation of information to prices. On the other hand, the model proposes that in-
vestors overreact to consistent series of information in a longer period of around three 
to five years, in both positive and negative information cases. In their model, continuous 
good or bad news drive prices to non-rational levels, which eventually leads to mean 
reversion.  
 
Instead of building their model on specific psychological models, Hong and Stein (1999) 
generate a model which is based on gradual diffusion of information across the popula-
tion. In their model, a short-term underreaction to information and continuance of re-
turns eventually leads to overreaction and return reversals in long-term time horizons. 
They conclude, that under- and overreactions should be more prevalent with firms that 
are small and have low-analyst coverage, in other words in stocks with slower diffusion 
of information. 
 
Fama (1998) argues that efficient market hypothesis is robust against behavioral models 
of long-term underreaction and overreaction to information. In fact, pure chance is given 
as an explanation for such anomalies, as the occurrence of these anomalies is roughly 
even and both post-event reversal and continuance of abnormal returns are almost 
evenly frequent. In other words, chance can create deviations in both directions in the 
expected abnormal returns of zero in the efficient capital markets. In addition, Fama 
(1998, p. 285) argues that behavioral models, such as the model by Barberis et al. (1998), 
explain the returns poorly outside the anomalies which they are designed to explain.  
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2.2 Dividend discount model 
To find investment opportunities and to price equities, one of the most well-known tools 
is the dividend discount model (DDM). Gaining its fundamental ideas from a book by 
Williams (1938), the model derives the price of stock, or its intrinsic value, as the dis-
counted present value of all its expected future dividends. The model assumes, that div-
idends are paid into perpetuity. (Bodie, Kane, & Marcus, 2011, p. 588) The dividend dis-
count model can be depicted with the following formula (Bodie, Kane, & Marcus, 2011, 
pp. 586-588):           
   
𝑉0 =  
𝐷1
1 + 𝑘
+
𝐷2
(1 + 𝑘)2
+
𝐷3
(1 + 𝑘)3
+ ⋯  (1) 
  
where  V0  = intrinsic value of the stock  
  D  = received dividend 
  k  = required rate of return 
 
In practice, assessing dividends to the perpetuity is complicated, and therefore the orig-
inal model has later been modified to have more practical value. Gordon and Shapiro 
(1956) simplify the assessment of future dividends by the concept of estimated constant 
growth rate, at which the future dividends are expected to grow. This constant-growth 
dividend discount model, also known as the Gordon model, can be presented with the 
following equation (Bodie, Kane, & Marcus, 2011, p. 589):  
 
𝑉0 =  
𝐷1
𝑘 − 𝑔
  (2) 
  
where  V0  = intrinsic value of the stock 
D1   = dividend paid at year one 
k  = required rate of return 
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g  = growth rate of the dividends 
 
Gordon and Shapiro (1956) conclude, that the condition for the model to hold is that the 
growth rate of the dividends g is lower than the required rate of return k. If the condition 
does not hold, the intrinsic value of the stock would be infinite. The fundamental impli-
cations of the constant-growth DDM are, that the value of an equity is higher when ei-
ther the required rate of return is lower, the expected dividend is higher, or when the 
growth rate of dividend increases (Bodie, Kane, & Marcus, 2011, p. 590). 
 
 
2.3 Capital asset pricing model 
The relationship between risk and returns is an interesting puzzle in finance, and many 
asset-pricing models have been created to explain the relation between the two. One of 
the most well-known asset pricing models is the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
originally created by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965), which is also a basis or inspiration 
for many subsequent pricing models. The model is based on the assumptions of the mar-
ket model, also known as the modern portfolio theory by Markowitz (1952). The CAPM 
predicts that the assets’ expected excess returns are in a positive linear relation to their 
systematic risk. The systematic risk of an asset is implied by its beta (β), and in its tradi-
tional form the asset is supposed to have relatively higher expected excess return with 
higher beta due to its higher systematic risk. According to the model, the asset’s ex-
pected excess returns should be strictly proportional to its beta. (Black, Jensen, & 
Scholes, 1972) The expected return of a stock and its relation to beta can be expressed 
with the following formula (Bodie, Kane, & Marcus, 2011, pp. 282, 293): 
 
𝐸(𝑅𝑖) =  𝑅𝑓 +  𝛽𝑖[𝐸(𝑅𝑚) −  𝑅𝑓]  (3) 
 
where  E(Ri)  = expected return of the security i 
  Rf  = risk-free rate 
  βi  = the beta coefficient of the security i 
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  E(Rm)  = expected return of the market portfolio m 
 
The traditional CAPM has certain assumptions, which are listed below (Black et al. 1972, 
pp. 1971-1972):   
 
1. All investors can choose the portfolio on the basis of mean and variance, 
therefore using portfolio selection model (Markowitz, 1952).  
2. Investors do not pay taxes or transaction costs. 
3. Investors have homogeneous views and expectations, meaning that they 
share the same parameters on the returns of securities in joint probability 
distributions. 
4. All investors can lend or borrow at a risk-free interest rate. 
 
The traditional form of the CAPM is not consistent in the empirical tests. Evidence by 
Black et al. (1972) show, that low-beta securities have positive intercepts and high-beta 
securities have negative intercepts, which is contrary to traditional theory, as low (high)-
beta securities have higher (lower) returns than what the model suggests. Also, not con-
sistent with the prediction of the model, the intercept and the slope of the CAPM vary 
throughout the different time periods. Roll (1977) concludes, that valid testing of CAPM 
is impossible due to presupposition that the true market portfolio is known, as the cor-
rect test would use a market portfolio that includes all individual assets. 
 
 
2.4 Three-factor model 
Continuing from the patterns left unexplained by the CAPM, Fama and French (1993) 
explain the average returns of securities with the three-factor model. Combining evi-
dence from various studies, Fama and French (1992) seek to explain the cross-section of 
average returns with beta, size as market capitalization, earnings-to-price-multiple, lev-
erage, and book-to-market equity-multiple. In addition to conclusion that the positive 
relation between beta and average stock returns is not found, they find that especially 
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the combination of size and book-to-market have a strong role in explaining average re-
turns, which also absorb the roles of earnings to price-multiple and leverage. The results 
mean, that instead of the risk of equities being one dimensional, there are multiple as-
pects of risk with affect the equities.  
 
Fama and French (1993) continue the tests with time-series regressions and have strong 
evidence that in addition to excess market return factor, size and book-to-market factors 
explain well the variations in average stock returns. Size and book-to-market equity are 
linked to be proxies that capture the risk of common stocks, as high book-to-market firms 
tend to be financially distressed and to have bad prospects and low earnings on assets, 
whereas low book-to-market equity firms tend to have persistently high earnings. Size is 
also linked to risk via earnings, as small firms tend to be riskier than big firms due to 
more unstable earnings. 
 
In the three-factor model, the size factor, known as SMB (small minus big), mimics the 
risk related to size by calculating the difference of average returns of portfolios of rela-
tively small market capitalization stocks and portfolios of relatively large market capital-
ization stocks with approximately matching weighted-average book-to-market equity. 
The book-to market equity risk factor, known as HML (high minus low), is measured by 
calculating the difference of average returns of two high book-to-market portfolios with 
large and small market capitalization stocks and two low book-to-market portfolios with 
approximately matching weighted-average size. (Fama & French, 1993) The three-factor 
model can be expressed with the following time-series regression equation (Fama & 
French, 2015, p. 2): 
 
                𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖(𝑅𝑀𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡) + 𝑠𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡  (4) 
   
where  Rit  = return on portfolio i for time t 
  RFt  = risk-free return 
  RMt  = return on the value-weighted market portfolio 
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  SMBt  = risk factor related to size 
  HMLt  = risk factor related to book-to-market equity 
  eit  = zero-mean residual 
 
In a case that the intercept ai is zero in the equation (4), the variation in expected returns 
is explained by the factors bi, si, and hi. Fama and French (1996) report, that the three-
factor model does well on explaining the risk of stock returns and shows ability to explain 
investment anomalies. Interestingly, long-term return reversals are explained with the 
three-factor model, as HML and SMB slopes tend to be positive on stocks with poor long-
term past performance and thus these stocks tend to have higher average returns in the 
future due to higher financial distress and smaller size. On the other hand, stocks with 
high long-term past performance tend to have low returns in the future and negative 
slope on HML risk factor, indicating of low financial distress. 
 
 
2.5 Five-factor model 
Even though the three-factor model is an improvement from CAPM in explaining the 
average stock returns, studies have reported anomalies which the model has difficulties 
to explain. Evidence from Titman, Wei and Xie (2004) show, that abnormal investment 
expenditures and future stock returns have a negative relation which is not explained by 
size and book-to-market risk factors. Firms with the highest addition to the level of cap-
ital expenditure tend to have gained positive returns in the past but gain lower returns 
up to next five years. As firms that have higher increases of capital expenditures are 
characterized by higher past returns and lower future returns, Titman et al. (2004) test 
the robustness of the results by controlling for long-term reversal of returns. They find 
that capital expenditures are independent of the return reversal effect but suggest that 
the reversal effect might be caused by the level of capital expenditures.  
 
Also, Novy-Marx (2013) finds that the three-factor model is unable to capture the effect 
of firms’ profitability in the cross section of average returns. Although having higher 
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valuation ratios, more profitable firms, proxied by gross profits-to-assets, tend to have 
significantly higher returns than firms with low profitability. In fact, profitability has ap-
proximately as high role in explaining the cross section of average returns as value factor, 
and profitability explains well a wide array of investment anomalies and strategies, es-
pecially anomalies which relate to earnings. Also, the returns of value strategies increase 
significantly when controlled for profitability. The results of Novy-Marx (2013) confront 
the original interpretation of value premium by Fama and French (1993), as value returns 
are not driven by financial distress, as value firms with higher profitability have higher 
returns than unprofitable value firms. These findings are also important from the aspect 
of this study, as firm profitability is one of the main dimensions of FSCORE, and FSCORE 
works as a leading indicator of firms’ future profitability as suggested by Piotroski (2000). 
 
Due to inability to capture the effects of investment and profitability in variation of av-
erage returns, Fama and French (2015) augment the three-factor model with profitability 
and investment factors. Profitability, known as RMW (robust minus weak), is measured 
by calculating the difference between stock portfolios with robust and weak operating 
profitability. Investment, known as CMA (conservative minus aggressive), is the differ-
ence between stock portfolios of low and high investment firms, where investment is 
measured as change in the total assets. As the value factor HML, the factors for profita-
bility and investment can be interpreted as the averages of the factor portfolios for small 
and large market capitalization stocks. Positive exposures to profitability and investment 
factors mean that these stocks tend to be profitable firms with conservative capital ex-
penditures, whereas negative slopes for these factors indicate relatively low profitability 
and aggressive capital expenditures. The five-factor model can be expressed with the 
following equation (Fama & French, 2015, p. 3): 
 
  𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖(𝑅𝑀𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡) + 𝑠𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 +
𝑟𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝑐𝑖𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 
(5) 
 
Where in addition to equation (4): 
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  RMWt  = risk factor related to profitability 
  CMAt  = risk factor related to investment 
 
As in the three-factor model, the intercept αi measures the abnormal return for a port-
folio i. One might ask, what is the rationale behind the decision to augment the three-
factor model with profitability and investment, as there are also other puzzles in explain-
ing the variation of stock returns. Fama and French (2015) explain the choice of profita-
bility and investment with theoretical assumptions, as the use of these factors is based 
on a derivation of the dividend discount model by Miller and Modigliani (1961). 
 
Generally, the five-factor model fares better than the three-factor model, capturing 
more anomalies and explaining better the variation in expected returns. Interestingly, 
augmenting the three-factor model with profitability and investment makes the value 
factor (HML) redundant, at least in U.S stock markets. On the other hand, the five-factor 
model has problems in the smallest size quintile portfolios with sorts on accruals, where 
the model does worse than the three-factor model. In addition, the five-factor model 
continues to fail in explaining momentum, which is reviewed in the next subchapter. 
(Fama & French, 2016)  
 
 
2.6 Six-factor model 
One puzzling phenomenon for the asset pricing models has been momentum effect. 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) find, that simply buying past winners and selling past losers 
gain significant abnormal returns. For instance, the effect is strong with six-month for-
mation and holding periods, with the returns dissipating 12 months after the portfolio 
formation. A strategy of buying past winners and selling past losers gains positive returns 
for all but the first month during a 12-month holding period. In the later studies, the 
momentum effect of returns is found on international markets for instance by Fama and 
French (2012) and Asness, Moskowitz, and Pedersen (2013), with an exception of Japa-
nese markets.  As one of the suggestions to explain the phenomenon, Jegadeesh and 
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Titman (1993) suggest, that the phenomenon is linked to behavioral bias, with investors 
underreacting to information about firms’ short-term prospects.  
 
The explanation for the momentum anomaly is under debate, with risk- and behavior-
based explanations suggested for the phenomenon. Generally supportive of underreac-
tion based hypothesis by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000) base 
their hypothesis on the gradual information diffusion model of Hong and Stein (1999) 
and use firm size and analyst coverage as the proxies for the model. They find that mo-
mentum strategies’ profitability declines significantly as the market capitalization in-
creases. Also, momentum returns tend to be higher with firms that have low analyst 
coverage.  
 
From a risk-based perspective, Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) create a market wide li-
quidity-based factor, “liquidity beta”, to measure stocks’ sensitivities to changes in ag-
gregate liquidity. They find that liquidity, measured with stocks’ daily returns and volume, 
has an important role in asset pricing. The spread between expected returns with the 
extreme decile portfolios gain abnormal annual returns of approximately 7.50% between 
the high liquidity beta portfolio and low liquidity beta portfolio, when controlling for the 
market, size, value, and momentum factors. Interestingly, a factor for liquidity risk ex-
plains about 50% of abnormal returns for momentum during the 34-year period used in 
the study. They conclude that the momentum strategy becomes less tempting when li-
quidity risk-based portfolio spreads are available, but do not successfully explain the 
whole phenomenon of momentum returns. Regardless of the specific explanation for 
the phenomenon, and as momentum is highly robust in out-of-sample tests and across 
asset classes as shown by Asness, Moskowitz and Pedersen (2013), Fama and French 
(2018) augment the five-factor model with momentum to form the six-factor model, 
which can be expressed with the following equation: 
 
  𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖(𝑅𝑀𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡) + 𝑠𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 +
𝑟𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝑐𝑖𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝑚𝑖𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 
(6) 
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Where in addition to equation (5): 
  UMDt  = risk factor related to momentum 
 
Momentum factor UMD (up minus down) is updated monthly by forming the portfolios 
based on average returns from months t-12 to t-2 with the portfolios being formed at 
the end of month t-1. In a similar fashion as value (HML), profitability (RMW), and in-
vestment (CMA) factors, momentum factor (UMD) is formed with spread portfolios by 
subtracting the average return on the two low past return portfolios of small and large 
market capitalization equities from the average return on the two high past return port-
folios with approximately matching weighted-average size. In this paper the three-, five- 
and six-factor models are all used in explaining the returns of long-term reversal portfo-
lios with fundamental strength-based sorts. 
 
Whereas profitability and investment factors go under the umbrella theory of dividend 
discount model, momentum factor is more complicated for the finance theory. Fama and 
French (2018) raise the concern of using seemingly robust anomalies such as momentum 
in the asset-pricing models, as without a clear explanation for such a phenomenon a 
question can be raised about the persistence of the patterns in the future. Also, although 
the momentum factor is used in the six-factor model, Fama and French (2018) suggest 
to limit the use of factors to such which are explained by theoretical models.  
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3 Literature review 
This chapter reviews the phenomenon of long-term return reversals in Chapter 3.1. 
Chapter also presents various explanations for the phenomenon. In Chapter 3.2, the 
studies regarding the concept of fundamental strength and fundamental scores are re-
viewed. 
 
 
3.1   Long-term return reversals 
In investing, overreactions can be explained as biased expectations of future earnings of 
stocks. For instance, people can become excessively pessimistic about certain stocks’ fu-
ture after a company repeatedly presents bad earnings reports. When in time the firm 
presents better than expected numbers, the stock reverts. On the other hand, people 
can also become overly optimistic with certain stocks, which eventually revert as the 
firms cannot fulfill the expectations. (De Bondt & Thaler, 1985) The main thesis in the 
paper from De Bondt and Thaler (1985) is, that if there is systematical overreaction in 
the markets, it can be observed by using only past return patterns instead of accounting 
data.  
 
Without going in specific to find the explanation behind the possible overreactions, De 
Bondt and Thaler (1985) conduct an empirical study by using monthly cumulative excess 
returns in U.S stock market, and suggest that by focusing on the most extreme returns 
of preceding five years, the stocks with poorest past returns, named as the loser stocks, 
outperform the market in the next three to five years after the portfolio formation. Sim-
ultaneously the stocks with the most extreme positive past returns, named as the winner 
stocks, perform worse than the market. De Bondt and Thaler (1985) find, that in a sub-
sequent three-year period, the past loser stocks have approximately 25% higher returns 
than the past winner stocks. Also, according to their hypothesis, the more extreme the 
past returns, the higher is the subsequent reversal of the stock. These findings are linked 
to investors’ overreaction. 
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Two years later in the follow-up study De Bondt and Thaler (1987) continue to find sim-
ilar systematic price reversals. By using accounting information, they also find that prior 
extreme stock returns predict later reversals in firm’s earnings, which indicates market 
inefficiency in recognizing mean reversion in future earnings of firms, being consistent 
with overreaction hypothesis. At the same time, the results cannot be primarily ex-
plained by the alternative hypotheses, which are the firm size effect or CAPM beta 
based-risk measurement. As in their previous study, unusually high returns in January 
are observed, especially for the past losers. In fact, most of the reversals occur during 
Januaries. De Bondt and Thaler (1987) link investors’ tax motivated trading as a possible 
explanation for the unusually high January returns. 
 
Conrad and Kaul (1998) analyze various return-based investment strategies in U.S stock 
markets and find long-term return reversals with holding periods from 18 to 36 months 
only partly profitable. Profitability of long-term reversals is statistically significant only 
on the subperiod of 1926-1947, and it is linked to severe and unusual price movements 
during the period. They argue that instead of time-series patterns of individual stocks, 
the cross-sectional variance in the mean returns of stocks is a major factor in generating 
the profitability of reversal strategies, and due to this reason the statistically significant 
returns disappear for other periods. 
 
Opposite to investor overreaction hypothesis, there are seasonality and risk-based ex-
planations for long-term reversals. Zarowin (1990) re-examines the overreaction hypoth-
esis and finds that three-year period reversals presented by De Bondt and Thaler (1985; 
1987) are due to size differences between winners and losers, as loser stocks tend to be 
smaller. When the size is controlled, losers outperform past winners only in January. 
Fama and French (1996) extend this analysis and explain the returns of long-term rever-
sals with the three-factor model. They find that past loser stocks tend to be relatively 
smaller and financially distressed and have on average higher future returns, whereas 
winners are relatively strong stocks with negative slopes on book-to-market factor and 
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low future returns. During the period from 1963 to 1993, long-term reversals exist up to 
five years, when using past 60 to 13 months returns in the formation. When the year 
before the formation is included, the winners gain higher returns than the losers due to 
continuation of short-term returns.  
 
Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004) link long-term reversals to seasonality and tax-loss sell-
ing and argue that  due to these reasons long-term reversal returns are driven by January 
effect. George and Hwang (2007) also challenge overreaction hypothesis with tax-based 
hypothesis with samples from U.S and Hong Kong. In U.S stock markets, they attribute 
the loser stock reversals to tax-loss selling in December, whereas the reversals for win-
ners are attributed to capital gains lock-in. Opposite to U.S, Hong Kong does not have 
capital gain taxes and the reversals disappear for winners and loser in every month in-
cluding January, therefore strengthening the evidence for tax-based hypothesis. Also, 
Yaqiong (2012) analyses U.S stock markets between 1926 and 2009 and suggests that 
the returns of long-term return reversals are not due to investor overreaction and are 
rather largely non-existent. He suggests that long-term reversals are economically and 
statistically significant only in January with small firms, whereas negative return autocor-
relations associated with long-term reversal returns are not robust outside January. As 
in the study by Fama and French (1996), the strategy differs from the original De Bondt 
and Thaler (1985) strategy, as there is one-year gap between portfolio formation and 
holding period. 
 
In accordance with risk-based hypothesis, Garcia-Feijoo and Jensen (2014) link long-term 
reversals to monetary conditions and in more specific to firms’ funding and to its con-
straints. The results suggest that the reversal returns of past losers are driven by im-
proved monetary conditions, during which liquidity increases, and risk aversion of inves-
tors is reduced. In their analysis the prices of loser stocks of preceding five years reverse 
only during expansive monetary environment, with the reversals existing even outside 
January during those conditions. In turn, restrictive monetary environment affects neg-
atively the firms which have relatively less access to funding, and which are more 
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dependent on external funding. The strongest reversals for loser stocks are obtained 
with small sized and financially distressed companies in line with risk-based explanations 
by Fama and French (1996). On the other hand, the return reversals for winner stocks 
occur only during restrictive monetary conditions, as the small sized and financially dis-
tressed past winners struggle the most during those conditions. The results of the study 
support the theory of time variation in risk and risk premium. 
 
Long-term reversals are also examined in international markets. Baytas and Cakici (1999) 
analyze past return performance in U.S and in six other industrialized countries using 
holding period returns instead of cumulated abnormal returns. In addition, they analyze 
price and size-based strategies which do not consider the past return performance. The 
price-based strategy buys stocks with lowest prices, and sells stocks with the highest 
prices, whereas size portfolios sort the stocks to groups based on their market capitali-
zation. Excluding U.S, they find evidence of overreaction and long-term return reversals 
are generally profitable with three-year arbitrage portfolios, which buys winners and 
sells losers. Baytas and Cakici (1999) suggest, that past performance based long-term 
reversal returns for winners and losers are partly explained by price and size effects. For 
example, the loser stocks are usually low priced and low market value companies. Their 
study finds that long-term strategies based on size and price outperform the long-term 
return reversal strategy, especially in the case of latter. 
 
Wu et al. (2012) analyze, whether long-term reversal returns are concentrated on low-
priced stocks. Using data from UK stock markets from 1970 to 2009, return reversals are 
found in low, middle, and high price levels for the past five-year losers and winners. The 
reversal returns are mainly driven by positive performance of past loser stocks. When 
the risk-adjusted performance is measured with Fama and French (1996) three-factor 
model, low and middle priced loser stocks have significantly positive abnormal perfor-
mance. In buy-losers and sell-winners zero-cost strategy, only the middle-priced stocks 
maintain significant positive returns. In addition to three-factor model, the returns are 
also measured with liquidity-augmented CAPM. Abnormal returns disappear for low-
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priced loser stocks when adjusted for liquidity and market risk, whereas abnormal re-
turns for middle-priced loser stocks endure. These findings go against the hypothesis 
that long-term reversal returns are driven only by low-priced stocks. Also, the findings 
generally support overreaction hypothesis. 
 
Chou, Wei and Chung (2007) use different ranking and holding period lengths from one 
month to three years and find that long-term return reversals are profitable in Japanese 
markets throughout all the time periods. The most prominent reversals occur in the one-
month and in the two-year and longer periods. The results are robust even when the 
companies with the most extreme past returns are excluded, or when there is a one-
month skip between portfolio formation and holding period. Chou et al. (2007) also sep-
arate the study’s horizon to bull and bear markets based on the market’s aggregate per-
formance. The analyzed strategies perform better when either formation or holding pe-
riod is in the bull market but are robust during both bull and bear market environments. 
Opposite to overreaction hypothesis, reversal returns are linked mainly to lead-lag effect, 
which means that there are positive autocorrelations between the stocks. Chou et al. 
(2007) use Fama and French (1996) three-factor model to explain reversal returns and 
argue that the returns are not due to pricing errors of the model, but rather attributed 
to cross-autocorrelations in company-specific error components. 
 
Galariotis (2012) analyzes the profitability of long-term return reversals in French stock 
markets and finds that portfolios are profitable on average, but the performance of 
hedge portfolios is not consistent from one period to another. The most profitable strat-
egy is to take long-only positions in losers during stable market conditions, as the results 
indicate that the winners do not systematically revert to losers. The returns are not ex-
plained by risk factors of Fama and French (1996) three-factor model. Rather the reversal 
returns in French stock markets are linked to overreaction hypothesis in the case of loser 
stocks, as for example the returns of the strategy increase with more extreme portfolio 
formations, meaning that less companies are included in the portfolio. 
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Differing from previously reviewed studies, Gropp (2004) analyzes the reversals in U.S 
stock markets from 1926 to 1998 using industry sorted portfolios. Alongside a standard 
long-term return reversal strategy based on the method of De Bondt and Thaler (1985), 
a parametric reversal strategy is used in the study. The purpose of parametric reversal 
strategy is to benefit from the mean reverting component in asset prices, and in fact the 
parametric reversal strategy outperforms the standard reversal strategy and an equal-
weighted market index. Bornholt, Gharaibeh and Malin (2015) also form industry port-
folios and find strong evidence of long-term industry reversals in U.S stock markets. In 
addition to a standard reversal strategy, the specialty of the study is to use longer for-
mation periods up to 11 years. Moreover, a late-stage return reversal strategy is used, 
which exploits double-sort method with long-term past performance and recent short-
term performance with an aim to pick stocks which are more likely to have reversals. The 
late stage return reversal strategy performs better than a standard reversal strategy. In-
terestingly, the industry reversals are documented in longer time periods up to 108, 120 
and 130 months, whereas reversals are not observed in conventional reversal strategies 
using formation and holding periods from three to five years. 
 
Similar industry reversals are also observed in international markets, as Wu and Mazouz 
(2016) analyze UK stock markets and find reversals in loser and winners industries, with 
the losers significantly outperforming the winners in subsequent five-year holding pe-
riod. The returns of industry reversal portfolios are robust to seasonal effects and the 
ability of traditional risk factors from the three- and five-factor models by Fama and 
French (1996; 2015) to explain the reversal returns is limited. Although, statistically sig-
nificant abnormal returns are weak in the five-factor model regressions. Moreover, the 
reversals are robust after controlling to stock- and industry-level momentum effect. The 
long-term industry reversals are linked to mispricing instead of risk-based explanation, 
as the returns increase for relatively lower analyst coverage and higher accrual industries. 
On the other hand, risk-adjusted abnormal stock-level reversals disappear entirely and 
are linked to tax loss selling hypothesis as they happen only during January and April, 
with April being tax year-end in UK. In addition, they study the relation of industry and 
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individual stock reversals and find that individual stock returns are heavily influenced by 
the past returns of industries, and therefore suggest that the stock reversals are due to 
industry components.  
 
 
3.2 Fundamental strength 
Financial statement information and fundamental analysis has been used to enhance 
various investment strategies, and for instance profitability related fundamental metrics 
have challenged asset pricing models such as Fama and French’s (1996) three-factor 
model. One of the popular metrics to sort firms to financially strong and weak is Piotro-
ski’s (2000) FSCORE. FSCORE is used as an accounting-based analysis tool, and it is cre-
ated by aggregating nine signals which measure firm’s historical profitability, financial 
leverage and operational efficiency, with a high FSCORE value indicating strong funda-
mentals and a low FSCORE value indicating weak fundamentals. In the original study, 
Piotroski (2000) combines the FSCORE with book-to-market ratio with a goal to differen-
tiate the fundamental strength of often neglected and thinly followed value stocks, as 
the valuation of these stocks with poor recent performance can rely on various account-
ing fundamentals such as profitability and leverage. Also, Piotroski (2000, p. 2) notes that 
the good performance of the value strategy of buying high book-to-market stocks relies 
on the good performance of a few stocks, whereas the majority of value stocks earn 
negative market-adjusted returns in the subsequent years. Therefore, it seems intuitive 
to try to enhance the returns of contrarian strategies by separating the firms with high 
fundamental strength from firms with deteriorating fundamentals. 
 
Piotroski (2000) finds predictable future return patterns when high book-to-market com-
panies are sorted to financially strong and weak companies with FSCORE. In addition, 
FSCORE works as a leading indicator of firms’ future profitability and earnings perfor-
mance. The results show that value investors can increase their average annual returns 
by at least 7.5% by choosing financially strong companies. By creating an arbitrage strat-
egy which buys expected winners and sells expected losers, annual returns are 
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substantially high at 23%. The strategy is robust throughout the whole time period from 
1976 to 1996. The findings are linked to investors’ underreaction to historical infor-
mation, with investors’ underweighting new financial information which contradicts 
with old information. The benefit of fundamental analysis by using FSCORE with high 
book-to-market firms focuses on small and medium sized firms with relatively lower an-
alyst following, which is linked to be driven by lower information dissemination amongst 
these groups. In large firms and stocks with relatively high analyst following, strong mar-
ket adjusted returns disappear which goes in line with gradual information diffusion 
model by Hong and Stein (1999). Therefore, the study also works as a supportive test of 
behavioral models in value investing environment.  
 
Regarding fundamental analysis with a simple profitability measure of gross profits-to-
assets, Novy-Marx (2013) finds that profitability significantly increases the performance 
of value strategy, with the effect being significantly strong among large-cap firms. There-
fore, firm profitability-related metrics have shown power in explaining returns in differ-
ent size groups, also in large caps. These findings are very puzzling from the perspective 
of original risk-based explanation for value effect, as the financial distress has been con-
sidered as the main driver for the value premium. Moreover, higher profitability leads to 
higher average returns on itself without controlling for value.  
 
In a follow-up study to Piotroski (2000), Piotroski and So (2012) form portfolios with 
FSCORE and book-to-market ratios, and they continue to enhance the returns of conven-
tional value/glamour strategy by including fundamental strength-based sorting in port-
folio formation. In their study, book-to-market ratio and FSCORE are used as proxies to 
measure investors’ market-based and fundamental-based expectations about the firm’s 
future earnings performance. For instance, low book-to-market ratio indicates high fu-
ture performance expectations and high book-to-market ratios indicates low future per-
formance expectations. They find that the value/glamour effect on the returns is statis-
tically and economically significant with firms where the expectations are incongruent 
with firm’s current fundamental strength. In other words, their hypothesis means there 
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are expectations errors which can be observed with released financial information. On 
the other hand, firms with congruent expectations implied by book-to-market ratios and 
current fundamental strength do not have statistically and economically significant 
value/glamour effect on the returns. In their study, E[E[BM] denotes the expectations 
implied by book-to-market ratios, and E[E[FSCORE] denotes the expectations implied by 
current fundamental strength. The expectations framework can be depicted by using the 
matrix presented in Table 2: 
 
Table 2. Value/Glamour portfolios (Piotroski & So, 2012, p. 2847). 
 
 
Low BM Firms "Glam-
our" (Strong expecta-
tions) 
Middle BM Firms 
High BM Firms "Value" 
(Weak expectations) 
Low FSCORE 
(Weak funda-
mentals) 
E[E|BM]> E[E|FSCORE] 
Overvalued firms 
Potential for overval-
ued firms 
E[E|BM]≈E[E|FSCORE] 
Middle FSCORE 
Potential for overvalued 
firms 
E[E|BM]≈E[E|FSCORE] 
Potential for underval-
ued firms 
High FSCORE 
(Strong funda-
mentals) 
E[E|BM]≈E[E|FSCORE] 
Potential for underval-
ued firms 
E[E|BM]<E[E|FSCORE] 
Undervalued firms 
 
In their expectation errors hypothesis, the incongruent portfolios with the strongest 
value/glamour effect are in upper-left and bottom-right corners of the matrix. Specifi-
cally, their strategy buys firms with high FSCORE and high-book-to-market in the bottom-
right corner and short sells firms with low FSCORE and low book-to-market in the upper-
left corner. Moreover, Piotroski and So (2012) find that investor sentiment’s variation has 
a significant effect on portfolios with stocks that have incongruent fundamental- and 
market-based expectations. They suggest, that when investor sentiment is high (low), 
the returns to the portfolios with incongruent market expectations and fundamental 
strength are relatively higher (lower). On the other hand, congruent value/glamour port-
folios do not have significant relation with the sentiment.  
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Choi and Sias (2012) find that financial strength, measured by FSCORE, has ability to pre-
dict future returns and in addition the future demand of institutional investors. The study 
suggests that future stock returns are predicted by fundamental strength partly because 
fundamentals predict the institutional demand, which drives the prices and generates 
higher returns for companies with high FSCORE. Institutional investor demand comes in 
two stages, with more sophisticated high-turnover institutions responding to the signals 
about fundamental strength before less sophisticated institutions with lower turnover. 
These findings support a behavioral framework of gradual incorporation of public infor-
mation, where investors either react slowly to new information which opposes the cur-
rent view, or where investors are prevented from reacting to new information due to 
market frictions.  
 
With similar methodology to Piotroski and So (2012), Ng and Shen (2016) test the per-
formance of FSCORE portfolios in seven Pacific-Basin stock markets. The mean returns 
of portfolios with strong fundamental stocks are higher when compared to portfolios 
with weak fundamentals at the significance level of 1% in all the seven markets included. 
Similarly, FSCORE sorting can enhance the returns of traditional book-to-market and size 
strategies, with the effect being more significant for the latter. Long-only strategy which 
buys value or small-cap stocks with high FSCORE outperforms the hedged zero-cost strat-
egy in most of the markets, with the long-only value strategy gaining statistically signifi-
cant positive returns in five of the seven markets included, whereas long-only size strat-
egy gains statistically significant returns in all of the markets. Moreover, the long-only 
and zero-cost strategies are robust after controlling for common risk factors.  
 
Similar to Ng and Shen (2016), Hyde (2018) analyzes portfolios sorted solely with FSCORE. 
With Australian stock sample, he finds that a zero-cost strategy which buys high FSCORE 
stocks and sells low FSCORE stocks is profitable, with high FSCORE firms having signifi-
cantly higher returns than low FSCORE firms. The returns are explained with the four-
factor model, which augments the three-factor model with 12-month momentum factor. 
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Abnormal returns are gained only with equal-weighted strategy that includes micro-cap 
stocks, whereas the abnormal returns disappear when using value-weighted returns. 
 
Walkshäusl (2017) tests expectation error hypothesis in European stock markets and 
finds similar results to Piotroski and So (2012), as the returns of value-growth strategies 
are concentrated on firms with expectation errors. Interestingly, the returns of the strat-
egy sustain up to three years after the portfolio formations and exist amongst large com-
panies. The obtained results are not explained by common risk factors, by using CAPM 
and the four-factor model to explain the returns. In addition, Walkshäusl (2017) studies 
the effect of prior external financing activities in the strategies. The study links prior stock 
issuances and repurchases as the explaining factor for value/glamour strategy returns in 
cases of portfolios with incongruent market expectations and fundamental strength. In 
other words, the return difference of repurchasing and issuing firms shows ability at ex-
plaining the returns of incongruent strategies. The thesis behind using prior financing 
activities as a factor for mispricing is that firms can exploit these activities in cases of 
under- or overvaluation, for instance by issuing capital when the firm’s stock is assumed 
to be overvalued. 
 
Tikkanen and Äijö (2018) combine FSCORE and several value strategies in various Euro-
pean stock markets, by using various financial ratios such as earnings-to-market and 
EBITDA-to-enterprise value to form the value portfolios. With the study focusing only on 
long-only portfolios, FSCORE enhances the performance of all value strategies analyzed 
in the study, with the best performance gained with EBITDA-to-enterprise value-sorted 
high fundamental strength portfolios. Compared to traditional value strategies, one of 
the highest improvements is gained by combining high FSCORE stocks and traditional 
book-to-market sorting. In addition to other risk measures, the study uses Fama and 
French (2015) five-factor model for explaining the returns and for analyzing the factor 
loadings of the strategies. Tikkanen and Äijö (2018) find that the returns are not fully 
explained by the model. Moreover, the study suggests that high FSCORE indicates 
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positive future profitability, as the profitability factor loading is positive and statistically 
significant in the five-factor model regression. 
 
By focusing on German stock market, Pätäri, Leivo, Hulkkonen and Honkapuro (2018) 
have similar findings as Tikkanen and Äijö (2018), as FSCORE-based screening can en-
hance the performance of a wide section of value strategies, and also low-accrual stocks. 
In addition, they find that outperformance of FSCORE-sorted strategies is concentrated 
on bearish market periods, when stock markets are in downtrend. FSCORE-based funda-
mental strength sorting enhances the average performance of the strategies also on bull 
market periods, but the effect is not as substantial. Moreover, the study finds a strong 
positive relationship between high FSCORE stocks and price momentum. 
 
In addition to value firms, quantitative fundamental analysis based on historical infor-
mation is reported to be able to separate future winners and losers amongst growth 
firms with low book-to-market ratios. Mohanram (2005) forms an aggregate index 
named GSCORE, which is created by using eight signal values from financial statement 
information that are assumed to be more suitable for growth stock analysis, such as sta-
bility of growth and capital expenditures. The study finds that high GSCORE firms with 
strong fundamentals have significantly higher returns than low GSCORE firms with weak 
fundamentals. In similar fashion as FSCORE, GSCORE also predicts the future perfor-
mance of earnings, as firms with high GSCORE are more likely to gain abnormal returns 
around subsequent earnings announcements. The good performance of the zero-cost 
long-short strategy is focused on the low returns of low GSCORE growth firms, and there-
fore the ability of shorting stocks is needed for the strategy to be profitable. The strategy 
is robust in highly followed large cap firms with high liquidity, which facilitates the im-
plementation of short strategies. The results are also robust to common risk factors, and 
the returns of the strategy are linked to mispricing and misinterpretation of financial 
information instead of risk-based explanations.  
 
37 
By employing both FSCORE and GSCORE, Duong, Pescetto and Santamaria (2014) study 
the effect of fundamental analysis on value and growth context in UK stock markets. The 
study implies that value investors should focus on the financially strong high FSCORE 
value stocks, while avoid shorting growth stocks with poor fundamentals as the short 
side is not profitable. Similarly to previous study by Mohanram (2005), growth investors 
should focus on shorting low GSCORE growth stocks as it covers the most of profits. 
Duong et al. (2014) link glamour and value effects to a one of the suggested investor 
behavior biases, known as confirmation bias, in which investors search and support in-
formation which is in line with their current views, and misinterpret opposing infor-
mation. From value investing perspective, confirmation bias can be interpreted as inves-
tors either reacting fairly or overreacting to bad financial information and underreacting 
to good information, which differs from their current view. On the other hand, growth 
investors react to good information quite efficiently or overconfidently and underreact 
to bad information, which once again differs from their own view of the stock’s prospects. 
Overall, the results of the study are not restricted to small sized and thinly traded stocks.  
 
Turtle and Wang (2017) analyze performance of portfolios by combining FSCORE and 
momentum, where the portfolios are long on past winners and short on past losers 
based on past returns. Especially the portfolios with high fundamental strength and high 
momentum have strong ex-post returns, which are not merely explained by compensa-
tion for higher risk. By using size, illiquidity and idiosyncratic risk as measures of infor-
mation uncertainty, they find that the performance of portfolios increases when infor-
mation uncertainty is higher. In other words, the observed mis pricings are mainly linked 
to gradual price adjustments to underreactions in environments of high information un-
certainty or investor sentiment, which is consistent with the behavioral framework from 
Daniel et al. (1998). Similarly, Chen et al. (2016) analyze momentum returns and combine 
FSCORE and GSCORE in the analysis. By incorporating these two fundamental metrics to 
momentum strategy, they obtain higher returns than with a standalone momentum 
strategy. Chen et al. (2016) argue, that the both fundamental scores incorporate 
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information that is not priced in the market in a timely manner, which generates higher 
returns.  
 
Similarly, Ahmed and Safdar (2018) manage to enhance the returns of momentum strat-
egy with financial statement analysis by using FSCORE. They hypothesize, that firms with 
incongruent fundamental strength and past performance should experience return re-
versals in the future, as their past performance is driven by non-fundamental drivers 
such as noise trading. On the other hand, firms with congruent fundamentals and past 
performance are more likely to continue to perform as in the past as their fundamentals 
are in line with the past performance. In accordance with their hypothesis, Ahmed and 
Safdar (2018) find that firms with congruent fundamental strength and past perfor-
mance have substantially more persistent returns than firms with incongruent funda-
mentals and past performance, which indicates that fundamental strength plays a critical 
role in momentum returns. A zero-cost strategy which buys strong winners and sells 
weak losers gains significantly higher average annual returns than a standard momen-
tum strategy, with the average returns of the strategies being 11.59% and 4.35%, respec-
tively. In addition, financial statement analysis can decrease the downside risk of mo-
mentum strategies. Consistent with the findings from U.S stock markets by Ahmed and 
Safdar (2018), Walkshäusl (2019) finds that momentum returns in European stock mar-
kets are also depended on the firms’ fundamental strength, and non-existent with firms 
that have incongruent fundamental strength and past performance. Interestingly from 
the perspective of this study, past losers with strong fundamentals and past winners with 
weak fundamentals exhibit significant return reversals in holding periods that are longer 
than one year.  
 
Regarding reversal strategies, Zhu et al. (2019) find results which are consistent with be-
havioral models of slow diffusion of information and investors’ underreaction from Hong 
and Stein (1999) and Hong et al. (2000). Zhu et al. (2019) suggest that FSCORE has a 
significant link on the performance of short-term reversal-based strategies. The study 
shows that high FSCORE firms with poor past performance during the past one month 
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have significantly high monthly returns, whereas companies with low FSCORE and good 
performance during the past month have systematic negative reversals. Compared to 
the standard zero-cost short-term reversal strategy without fundamental-based sorting, 
the returns of the fundamental strength-based reversal strategy are almost four times 
higher. This arbitrage strategy, called fundamental-anchored reversal (FAR) strategy is 
created by buying past losers with high fundamental strength and selling past winners 
with low fundamental strength. On the other hand, fundamental-unanchored reversal 
(FUR) strategy, which is created by buying past losers with low financial strength and 
selling past winners with high financial strength, performs significantly worse than the 
FAR-strategy. Importantly, the FAR-strategy’s reversals withstand in non-January months 
and gain abnormal returns when controlled with the risk factors of the three- and five-
factor models. The results suggest that profitability of the strategy is strongly linked to 
investor sentiment and therefore to mis pricing. 
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4 Data and methodology 
This chapter presents the data and methodology which are used to form and analyze the 
fundamental long-term reversal strategies. Chapter 4.1 presents formation of FSCORE 
and the portfolios. In Chapter 4.2, the risk-adjusted performance measures used in the 
study are presented. 
 
In this study, the stocks are double sorted to portfolios with past performance and 
FSCORE-values. Stock and market index performance data is collected from Thomson 
Reuters Datastream, and financial statement information for the calculation of FSCORE 
is collected from Worldscope. Stock market data includes the stocks included in S&P 
1500 index at the time of data collection at the end of May 2019. S&P 1500 consists of 
all the stocks included in the S&P 500, S&P 400, and S&P 600 indices.  
 
 
4.1 FSCORE and portfolio formation 
To measure the fundamental strength of firms, stocks are sorted to portfolios based on 
the FSCORE-value calculated with the most recent year-end financial statement infor-
mation before the portfolio formation. Originally presented by Piotroski (2000), FSCORE 
is used here similarly and separated to nine signals based on firm profitability, change in 
financial leverage/liquidity and change in operational efficiency. Every signal gives a bi-
nary value of one or zero, and by aggregating the signal values FSCORE gives a total value 
between zero and nine for every stock. The signal points consist of the following nine 
attributes (Piotroski & So, 2012, pp. 2870-2871):  
 
- positive return on assets (ROA) 
- positive cash flow from operations (CFO) 
- positive change in return of assets (ΔROA) 
- positive difference on current year’s net income before extraordinary items mi-
nus cash flow from operations (ACCRUAL) 
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- positive change in long term debt (ΔLEVER) 
- positive change in current ratio (ΔLIQUID) 
- no issuance of new equity (ISSUANCE) 
- positive change in gross margin (ΔMARGIN) 
- positive change in asset turnover ratio (ΔTURN) 
 
FSCORE-value of nine signals the highest level of financial strength and value of zero sig-
nals the lowest. The more detailed definitions of the financial performance signals are 
reported in the Appendix 1. The aggregate FSCORE can be expressed with the following 
equation (Piotroski & So, 2012, p. 2871): 
 
  𝐹𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 = 𝐹𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑂 + 𝐹𝛥𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝐹𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑈𝐴𝐿 +
𝐹𝛥𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅 + 𝐹𝛥𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑈𝐼𝐷 + 𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸 + 𝐹𝛥𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐼𝑁 + 𝐹𝛥𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁  
(7) 
 
In the portfolio formation, the reversal portfolios are first created by ranking the stocks 
to quartiles based on the past 36 months returns, with both ranking and holding periods 
set to be three years. The returns are measured using compound returns. The stocks 
with the compound return at the 1st quartile and below are sorted to loser portfolio, and 
the stocks with the return at the 3rd quartile and above are sorted to winner portfolio. 
This process is repeated for every non-overlapping period of 36 months. 
 
The portfolios are sorted to subgroups between high and low fundamental strength, 
with FSCORE equal to seven and above indicating high fundamental strength and FSCORE 
equal to three and below indicating low strength. In total four double sorted portfolios 
are formed for every non-overlapping time period on the last trading day of June based 
on the past 36-months returns and previous year-end accounting variables. In addition, 
simple loser and winner portfolios without FSCORE-sorting are formed and reported in 
the study. The last trading day of June is chosen as the portfolio formation date as in the 
previous literature by Turtle and Wang (2017), Walkshäusl (2017), and Tikkanen and Äijö 
(2018), to make sure that the accounting information was available for investors at the 
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formation of portfolios. In addition, financial firms with Datastream industry codes 4300-
4395 are excluded from the sample. This is similar to previous studies using FSCORE, as 
the calculation methodology of financial statements for financial firms differs from the 
other firms (Piotroski & So, 2012; Walkshäusl, 2017; Tikkanen & Äijö, 2018). 
 
Table 3 presents the number of stocks in each portfolio for each three-year holding pe-
riod. Simple loser and simple winner portfolios are the strategies without FSCORE double 
sorting. Low fundamental loser (LF-L) and high fundamental loser (HF-L) portfolios in-
clude past loser stocks with low and high fundamental strength, respectively. Low fun-
damental winner (LF-W) and high fundamental winner (HF-W) portfolios include past 
winner stocks with low and high fundamental strength, respectively. As it can be seen 
from Table 3, number of stocks is increasing for the more recent portfolios. This is ex-
plained by the data collection method, as the data includes only the stocks included in 
S&P 1500 at the time of data collection at the end of May 2019. This leads to a survivor-
ship bias, which can positively skew the returns of the portfolios. Analyzing uncondi-
tional long-term returns, Loughran and Ritter (1996, p. 1964) show, that the effect of 
survivorship bias is stronger with past losers than past winners in three-year holding pe-
riods. They report that on average 20 percent of simple losers and ten percent of the 
winners do not survive the whole holding period. Therefore, especially the loser portfo-
lios’ returns can be upwardly biased in this study. Moreover, the returns of low funda-
mental strength portfolios can be relatively more positively skewed due to survivorship 
bias, as Piotroski and So (2012, p. 2845) suggest that low FSCORE firms tend to have 
more de-listings due to reasons related to performance than firms with high FSCORE. 
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Table 3. Number of stocks in portfolios. 
 
  Simple loser Simple winner LF-L HF-L LF-W HF-W 
7/1/1991-6/30/1994 117 117 14 14 3 35 
7/1/1994-6/30/1997 129 129 18 25 3 52 
7/1/1997-6/30/2000 162 160 22 33 8 68 
7/1/2000-6/30/2003 187 187 25 45 14 66 
7/1/2003-6/30/2006 210 210 43 30 7 109 
7/1/2006-6/30/2009 224 224 18 60 9 118 
7/1/2009-6/30/2012 241 240 44 40 9 103 
7/1/2012-6/30/2015 255 254 21 68 10 129 
7/1/2015-6/30/2018 270 269 23 71 14 121 
 
Table 3 shows that the number of stocks in the low fundamental winner strategy is low 
throughout the analysis period, which limits the reliable use of it in the analysis. There-
fore zero-cost strategy formed by buying high fundamental losers and selling low funda-
mental winners is not formed in this study, as it is done in the value/growth framework 
by Piotroski and So (2012) with so-called incongruent value/glamour strategy. Low num-
ber of past winners with low fundamental strength and significantly higher number of 
past winners with high fundamental strength is economically explainable, as it can be 
expected that stocks that have performed the best also tend to have stronger fundamen-
tal strength.  
 
Panel A in Table 4 presents the distribution of FSCORE values at the year-end before 
portfolio formations. In total, the sample includes 7,380 firm-year observations. The 
sample includes significantly more high (7-9) FSCORE values than low (0-3) FSCORE val-
ues, the amounts being 2,612 and 541, respectively. For instance, the sample has only 
three FSCORE values of zero. 
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Table 4. Distribution of FSCORE values and descriptive statistics of variables. 
 
 Panel A: Distribution of FSCORE values.   
FSCORE     N 
 
0    
 3  
1    
 27  
2    
 125  
3    
 386  
4    
 919  
5    
 1 474  
6    
 1 834  
7    
 1 506  
8    
 878  
9    
 228  
Total     7 380  
       
 Panel B: Descriptive statistics of FSCORE and market value   
 Mean 25th Median 75th Std. Dev.  
FSCORE 5.84 5.00 6.00 7.00 1.57  
Market value 8417.03 453.97 1413.52 4974.55 28611.74  
 
Panel B in Table 4 reports descriptive statistics of two variables, FSCORE and market value, 
with the latter depicted as the market value of equity in millions at the end of June in 
the year of portfolio formation. Mean FSCORE value of the sample is skewed towards 
higher FSCORE values, being 5.84. As a comparison, the mean FSCORE reported by 
Walkshäusl (2017, p. 849) is slightly lower at 5.56 in European stock markets. Mean 
market value of the sample is markedly higher than median market value, which 
indicates that the sample has substantial skewness towards large capitalization stocks. 
Mean market value of $8,417 million is significantly higher than in the study by Ahmed 
and Safdar (2018, p. 14) which has a mean market value of $3,185 million.  
 
The returns for each three-year fundamental reversal strategies are calculated as value-
weighted compound returns, presented in annual and monthly terms to compare the 
returns of winner and loser portfolios with high and low fundamental strength levels. 
Traditionally many studies use equal-weighted returns in portfolio formation, but value-
weighted returns are used here to give more reliable results, as equal-weighted returns 
would overestimate the role of microcaps (Hou, Xue, & Zhang, 2018). Also, investor’s 
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total wealth effect is better captured by using value-weight (Fama, 1998). Table 5 pre-
sents the descriptive statistics of raw monthly returns of each portfolio. 
 
Table 5. Descriptive statistics of raw monthly returns. 
 
  Simple loser Simple winner LF-L HF-L LF-W HF-W Market1 
 Mean 0.013 0.010 0.013 0.014 0.012 0.011 0.009 
 Median 0.016 0.010 0.016 0.015 0.011 0.009 0.013 
 Maximum 0.177 0.160 0.182 0.198 0.523 0.176 0.114 
 Minimum -0.156 -0.229 -0.172 -0.149 -0.270 -0.242 -0.175 
 Std. Dev. 0.046 0.052 0.061 0.054 0.079 0.059 0.041 
 Skewness -0.256 -0.540 -0.255 0.003 0.589 -0.483 -0.680 
 Kurtosis 4.599 4.746 3.377 4.183 8.675 4.847 4.679 
 Observations 324 324 324 324 324 324 324 
1 Russell 1000 total return index is used as the benchmark market index 
 
Table 5 shows, that the low fundamental winner strategy is highly leptokurtic, which 
means that it is more unreliable as it has a higher probability to have extreme values. It 
also has the highest standard deviation. The key strategy of interest, the high fundamen-
tal losers, has the highest mean raw monthly return of the seven portfolios, being 1.4%. 
It also has the least negative minimum monthly raw return at -14.9%.  
 
 
4.2 Risk-adjusted performance measures 
Risk-adjusted return performance of the strategies is analyzed using Sharpe and Sortino 
ratios. In addition, the strategies are regressed with the common risk factors of Fama 
and French (2018) three-, five-, and six-factor models. Sharpe (1966) ratio is commonly 
used in portfolio and mutual fund analysis. In Sharpe ratio, risk-return relationship is in-
terpreted in a way that higher variability of returns (risk) typically means higher returns. 
The ratio uses portfolio’s returns’ standard deviation as the risk measure. A higher 
Sharpe ratio means better risk-adjusted performance. Sharpe ratio can be expressed 
with the following equation: 
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𝑆𝑝 =
𝑅𝑝 − 𝑅𝑓
𝜎𝑝
  (8) 
 
where  Rp  = return of the portfolio p 
  Rf  = risk-free return 
  σp  = standard deviation of the portfolio p’s excess return 
 
The numerator of the ratio depicts the reward that the investor gets on top of risk-free 
return. Therefore, Sharpe ratio illustrates the reward that investor receives for a unit of 
risk. (Sharpe, 1966) In contrast to Sharpe ratio, Sortino (1994) ratio replaces standard 
deviation with downside deviation in the denominator. Downside deviation measures 
only the standard deviation of the returns below a discretionary minimum acceptable 
return (MAR), in other words, the root-mean-square deviation of portfolio returns below 
a specified minimum acceptable return. In this study, the risk-free rate is used as the 
minimum acceptable return in a similar fashion as by Tikkanen and Äijö (2018). By using 
Sortino ratio, extreme positive and negative returns are not treated equally, and there-
fore the portfolio’s ratio is not negatively affected when gaining extreme positive returns. 
Sortino ratio can be expressed with the following equation: 
 
𝑆𝑜𝑅𝑝 =
𝑅𝑝 − 𝑀𝐴𝑅
𝐷𝐷
  (9) 
 
where  Rp  = return of the portfolio p 
  MAR  = minimum acceptable return 
  DD  = downside deviation   
 
In a more meticulous risk analysis, Fama and French (2018) three-, five-, and six-factor 
models are used to analyze whether the performance of the strategies is explained by 
the common risk factors. Also, the risk characteristics of the strategies can be analyzed 
by comparing individual factor loadings. The six-factor model can be expressed with the 
following equation: 
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  𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖(𝑅𝑀𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡) + 𝑠𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 +
𝑟𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝑐𝑖𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝑚𝑖𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 
(10) 
 
where  Rit  = return of the portfolio i for time t 
  RFt  = risk-free return 
  RMt  = return on the value-weighted market portfolio 
  SMBt  = risk factor related to size 
  HMLt  = risk factor related to book-to-market equity 
RMWt  = risk factor related to profitability 
  CMAt  = risk factor related to investment 
  UMDt  = risk factor related to momentum 
eit  = zero-mean residual 
 
The five-factor model is identical to the equation (10), except that the factor for momen-
tum (UMD) is omitted from the model. Moreover, the three-factor model omits the fac-
tors for profitability (RMW) and investment (CMA) from the regression, leaving only the 
market, size (SMB) and book-to-market (HML) factors. In all the three models, intercept 
αi measures abnormal returns for the portfolio i. In a case that αi is positive and statisti-
cally significant, the returns of the strategies are not explained with the model, and thus 
the strategy gains abnormal returns. The factors, excess returns of the market, and one-
month T-bill return which is used as the risk-free rate for the factor models and Sharpe 
and Sortino ratios, are gathered from Kenneth R. French’s online data library.1 The factor 
regressions conducted in this study are corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorre-
lation by using Newey and West’s (1987) standard errors.  
 
1 The factors are publicly available at https://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_li-
brary.html. 
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5 Results 
This chapter presents the empirical results, and the hypotheses H1 and H2 are tested. 
By using portfolio analysis, hypothesis H1 tests whether firms with incongruent past 
long-term returns and fundamental strength have stronger long-term reversals than 
firms with congruent past returns and fundamental strength. This hypothesis is moti-
vated by the results of previous literature such as Piotroski and So (2012), Walkshäusl 
(2017), Ahmed and Safdar (2018), and Zhu et al. (2019). By using regression analysis, 
hypothesis H2 tests whether the returns of the fundamental long-term reversal strate-
gies are explained by common risk factors. If the hypothesis H2 holds, the strategies do 
not gain abnormal returns and they are explained by common risk factors. 
 
Chapter 5.1 presents the results regarding strategies’ raw and risk adjusted returns. In 
Chapter 5.2, the returns are analyzed in a year-to-year basis, to see whether the reversals 
persist throughout the three-year holding periods. The discussion around hypothesis H1 
is at the focus in the first two subchapters. Chapter 5.3 presents the results of Fama and 
French (2018) three-, five-, and six-factor model regressions, and hypothesis H2 is tested. 
 
 
5.1 Raw and risk-adjusted returns 
Panel A in Table 6 reports the monthly and annual compound raw returns of the strate-
gies for the sample period 7/1/1991-6/30/2018. Simple loser and simple winner portfo-
lios include stocks that are sorted only by past returns. Low fundamental loser (LF-L) and 
high fundamental loser (HF-L) portfolios include past loser stocks with low and high fun-
damental strength, respectively. Low fundamental winner (LF-W) and high fundamental 
winner (HF-W) portfolios include past winner stocks with low and high fundamental 
strength, respectively. 
 
Panel A of Table 6 shows, that the high fundamental loser strategy yields the highest 
monthly raw return of 1.25%, followed by the simple loser strategy (1.18%) and the low 
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fundamental loser strategy (1.13%). In this comparison, the loser strategy with incongru-
ent fundamental strength leads to higher raw returns than the congruent low fundamen-
tal loser strategy, and the returns are also higher than with the strategy of buying losers 
without fundamental sorting. Similar effect cannot be found amongst the winners, as 
the low and high fundamental winner strategies have almost equal raw returns.  
 
Table 6. Monthly and annual compound raw returns, Sharpe, and Sortino ratios. 
 
 Panel A: Compound raw returns (%)  
  Simple loser Simple winner LF-L HF-L LF-W HF-W Market 
One month 1.18 0.89 1.13 1.25 0.91 0.91 0.80 
Annual 15.15 11.28 14.49 16.03 11.46 11.51 10.08 
        
 Panel B: Compound raw returns without January (%)  
  Simple loser Simple winner LF-L HF-L LF-W HF-W Market 
One month 1.17 0.96 1.02 1.26 1.12 0.97 0.85 
Annual 14.98 12.20 12.96 16.20 14.32 12.25 10.71 
        
 Panel C: Annual Sharpe and Sortino ratios     
  Simple loser Simple winner LF-L HF-L LF-W HF-W Market 
Sharpe 0.78 0.47 0.56 0.71 0.32 0.43 0.52 
Sortino 1.13 0.64 0.84 1.11 0.48 0.59 0.69 
 
Panel B in Table 6 shows how excluding January returns from the holding period affect 
raw returns of the strategies. Raw returns of the simple loser and the high fundamental 
loser strategies stay almost unchanged, with the latter slightly increasing to monthly re-
turn of 1.26%. On the other hand, monthly raw returns of the low fundamental losers 
decrease from 1.13% to 1.02%. Results from the low fundamental losers are similar to 
Yaqiong (2012, p. 2762), as he reports that the subsequent value-weighted returns of 
the lowest decile of past long-term losers drop from 1.63% to 1.04% when Januaries are 
excluded. The results from the loser side are also similar to Zhu et al. (2019, p. 29), who 
find that the short-term monthly fundamental-anchored reversals sustain without Janu-
ary, whereas the returns of fundamental-unanchored reversals become negative. In ad-
dition, Panel B in Table 6 shows that excluding January returns affects the returns of the 
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winner strategies. In fact, all the three winner strategies have higher raw returns when 
Januaries are excluded, with the monthly raw returns of the low fundamental winners 
increasing the most from 0.91% to 1.12%. These results are consistent with Grinblatt and 
Moskowitz (2004, p. 557), who report that the returns of the winners reverse during 
Januaries and thus January has a negative effect on winner returns, whereas outside 
Januaries there are only little reversals. 
 
Panel C of Table 6 reports the risk-adjusted returns of the strategies. When measuring 
the risk-adjusted returns with Sharpe ratio, the simple loser has the highest ratio of 0.78 
followed by the high fundamental loser with a ratio of 0.71. The high fundamental losers 
have a higher Sharpe ratio than the low-fundamental losers (0.56) or the market (0.52). 
Similarly, the high fundamental winners have higher Sharpe ratio than the low funda-
mental winners, but both strategies lose to the simple winners which do not have 
FSCORE-based fundamental strength sorting.  
 
When measuring the risk only by downside deviation by using Sortino ratio in Panel C of 
Table 6, the simple loser still has the highest risk-adjusted return with a ratio of 1.13, 
closely followed by the high fundamental loser (1.11). Both strategies have substantially 
higher Sortino ratio than the market which has a ratio of 0.52. With both winners and 
losers, the high fundamental strategies have higher risk-adjusted returns than the low 
fundamental strategies.  
 
 
5.2 Year-to-year returns 
This sub-chapter analyzes the persistence of the returns throughout the three-year hold-
ing periods in year-to-year basis, in a similar fashion as by Walkshäusl (2017) in the 
value/glamour context. Compounded raw returns of the strategies are reported in the 
analysis. Statistical significance of the year-to-year returns is measured with one tail 
paired two-sample t-test, where the average return difference between the fundamental 
reversal strategies and the market portfolio Russell 1000 is measured. Figure 1 shows 
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raw returns of the high- and low fundamental loser portfolios during the first holding 
years. For instance, the returns for year 1991 depicts compounded raw returns from be-
ginning of July 1991 to end of June 1992.   
 
 
 
Figure 1. Returns of the fundamental loser portfolios for the first holding years. 
 
Figure 1 shows, that all the portfolios for the high and low fundamental losers have pos-
itive raw returns for the first holding years.  The first-year average returns are highly sta-
tistically significant at 1% level for the both strategies, with the average returns being 
28.48% (t-statistic = 2.59) for the high fundamental losers, and 27.85% (t-statistic = 2.49) 
for the low fundamental losers. Figure 2 shows the raw returns for the second holding 
years for the high-and low fundamental loser portfolios.  
 
 
0.00%
10.00%
20.00%
30.00%
40.00%
50.00%
60.00%
1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015
HF-L LF-L
52 
 
 
Figure 2. Returns of the fundamental loser portfolios for the second holding years. 
 
Figure 2 shows, that the second holding years’ average returns for the high and low fun-
damental losers decrease from the first holding years, being on average 20.77% (t-statis-
tic = 1.93) for the high fundamental losers, and 14.40% (t-statistic = 0.25) for the low 
fundamental losers. The average raw returns for the high fundamental losers are statis-
tically significant at level of 5%, whereas the returns of the low fundamental losers be-
come insignificant. Seven out of nine of the high fundamental loser portfolios have pos-
itive returns for the second holding years, whereas six out of nine are positive for the 
low fundamental losers. Finally, the third years’ raw returns are shown in the Figure 3.  
 
 
 
Figure 3. Returns of the fundamental loser portfolios for the third holding years. 
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Figure 3 shows, that the returns continue to decrease for the high and low fundamental 
loser portfolios in the third holding years. The average annual returns for the high and 
low fundamental losers are 4.02% (t-statistic = -0.15) and 6.72% (t-statistic = 0.41), re-
spectively, with the both average returns being statistically insignificant. In the third 
holding years, five of nine high fundamental loser portfolios have positive returns, 
whereas six of nine low fundamental loser portfolios have positive returns. These results 
indicate that the reversal returns are stronger and more robust for the high fundamental 
losers than for the low fundamental losers, and the reversals for the high fundamental 
losers occur approximately in two years after the portfolio formation. These results indi-
cate, that for instance an asymmetric strategy with a three-year formation and only a 
one-year holding period could be more optimal strategy.  
 
The year-to-year raw returns for the high and low fundamental winner portfolios are 
reported in the Appendix 2. Similar return reversals do not occur for the winners as for 
the losers, as six out of nine of the low fundamental winner portfolios have positive re-
turns in the first year, eight in the second year and seven in the third year. Similarly, seven 
portfolios of the high fundamental winners have positive returns in the first and second 
year, and eight of the third-year portfolios have positive raw returns. The first and second 
year average raw returns of the high fundamental winner portfolios are statistically in-
significant, whereas the third-year returns become significant at level of 10% (t-statistic 
= 1.58). The first and third year average raw returns of the low fundamental winners are 
statistically insignificant, whereas the second-year average raw returns are significant at 
level of 10% (t-statistic = 1.30). These results are consistent with Galariotis (2012), who 
studies simple unconditional long-term return reversals and finds that systematical re-
versals occur only within the past losers. The results are also consistent with Duong et 
al. (2014), who suggest in a value context that investors should rely on long-only strategy 
with high FSCORE value stocks, as the short side with low fundamental growth stocks is 
not profitable.  
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Reviewing the Chapters 5.1 and 5.2 from the perspective of hypothesis H1, the results 
show that the reversals are stronger for the loser strategy with incongruent current fun-
damentals and past returns (HF-L) than for the loser strategy with congruent current 
fundamentals and past returns (LF-L). On the other hand, the past winners with incon-
gruent fundamentals and past returns (LF-W) do not have systematical reversals. There-
fore, the hypothesis H1 is supported when considering only the past loser reversals. 
 
 
5.3 Factor model regressions 
Next, it is tested whether the returns of the strategies are explained by the common risk 
factors of Fama and French (2018) three, five-, and six-factor models. Table 7 reports the 
loadings of the three-factor model, where market, size (SMB) and value (HML) are the 
explaining factors. After controlling for the three factors, the simple loser and the high 
fundamental loser strategies gain monthly abnormal returns of 0.32% and 0.42%, re-
spectively. Both strategies’ abnormal returns are statistically significant at 5% level. 
Therefore, the three-factor model cannot fully explain the returns of the loser strategies, 
except in case of the low fundamental losers. As a comparison, the abnormal returns 
gained by FSCORE-sorted incongruent value/glamour strategy are higher, as Piotroski 
and So (2012, p. 2866) report monthly abnormal returns of 0.98% when regressed with 
the four-factor model which adds momentum factor to the regression. With the winner 
strategies, the returns are explained by the risk factors of the three-factor model. 
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Table 7. Three-factor model loadings. 
 
  Simple loser Simple winner LF-L HF-L LF-W HF-W 
alpha 0.315** 0.185 0.170 0.423** 0.219 0.222 
 (2.068) (1.289) (0.785) (1.976) (0.674) (1.133) 
Market 0.932*** 1.107*** 1.071*** 0.962*** 1.192*** 1.171*** 
 (16.182) (22.816) (14.482) (12.049) (11.724) (19.441) 
SMB 0.122** -0.167*** 0.460*** -0.010 0.223** -0.245*** 
 (2.483) (-4.155) (6.489) (-0.102) (2.123) (-3.568) 
HML 0.431*** -0.394*** 0.524*** 0.421*** -0.313* -0.442*** 
 (4.677) (-8.129) (5.358) (3.278) (-1.819) (-6.891) 
       
Adj. R-Sqr. 0.749 0.847 0.634 0.549 0.459 0.743 
T-statistics are reported in the parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
Regarding different risk characteristics, Table 7 shows that all the three loser portfolios 
have positive and highly significant value factor loadings, with the low fundamental los-
ers having the highest loading at 0.524. Therefore similar value-effect can be captured 
by using long-term past returns, as for instance Piotroski and So (2012) and Walkshäusl 
(2017) has captured by using pricing multiples. The simple loser and the low fundamen-
tal loser strategies also have positive and significant size factor coefficients, with the lat-
ter having substantially higher loading at 0.460. On the other hand, the high fundamen-
tal losers do not have a significant size factor loading.  
 
The winner strategies have different risk characteristics when compared to loser strate-
gies. In Table 7, all the winner strategies have a negative and significant value factor co-
efficient on 10% significance level or higher, with the high fundamental winners having 
the most negative loading at -0.442. This is consistent with Fama and French (1996), who 
find that the long-term winners tend to have a negative value factor loading, whereas 
the long-term losers have a positive value factor exposure. Also, the simple winners and 
the high fundamental winners have a negative and statistically significant coefficient on 
size factor, indicating that the winners tend to be larger firms, with an exception of the 
low fundamental winners. In both the low fundamental losers and the low fundamental 
winners, the size factor coefficient is positive and statistically significant which indicates 
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that the low fundamental firms tend to be smaller firms, which is consistent with previ-
ous research by Walkshäusl (2017). 
 
Table 8 reports the loadings of the five-factor model, where profitability (RMW) and in-
vestment (CMA) factors are added to the model. After controlling for the five factors, the 
alphas become insignificant for all the strategies and therefore abnormal returns are not 
gained. This is opposite to the study by Tikkanen and Äijö (2018) who implement equal-
weight FSCORE-sorted value portfolios in various European markets, and gain statistically 
significant abnormal returns when regressing with the five-factor model. Similarly, Zhu 
et al. (2019) find statistically significant five-factor model abnormal returns with equal-
weight portfolios with fundamental-anchored short-term reversal strategy. However, the 
abnormal returns decrease and become insignificant when using value-weighted port-
folios. In this study value-weighted portfolios are used instead of equal-weight, which 
can substantially decrease the abnormal returns of the strategies, as also shown by Hou, 
Xue, and Zhang (2018) who show that most of the anomalies disappear when value-
weight returns are used instead of equal-weight. 
 
Table 8. Five-factor model loadings. 
 
  Simple loser Simple winner LF-L HF-L LF-W HF-W 
alpha 0.080 0.160 0.061 0.123 0.230 0.222 
 (0.610) (1.164) (0.255) (0.637) (0.642) (1.160) 
Market 1.055*** 1.106*** 1.141*** 1.113*** 1.172*** 1.155*** 
 (18.940) (21.100) (15.607) (15.250) (10.988) (16.988) 
SMB 0.190*** -0.086* 0.438*** 0.108 0.304*** -0.163** 
 (3.166) (-1.872) (5.935) (1.159) (2.927) (-2.136) 
HML 0.130* -0.278*** 0.224* 0.107 -0.263 -0.274*** 
 (1.686) (-4.156) (1.776) (0.848) (-1.594) (-2.870) 
RMW 0.269*** 0.176*** 0.024 0.394*** 0.076 0.155 
 (3.049) (2.661) (0.227) (3.139) (0.485) (1.426) 
CMA 0.497*** -0.299*** 0.493*** 0.511** -0.244 -0.377** 
 (4.086) (-2.604) (2.664) (2.311) (-0.784) (-2.145) 
       
Adj. R-Sqr. 0.783 0.858 0.644 0.583 0.461 0.752 
T-statistics are reported in the parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Also, the risk characteristics of the strategies change when adding profitability and in-
vestment factors to the model. Table 8 reports that the magnitude of the loser strategies’ 
value factor loadings decrease and become less significant. In case of the high funda-
mental losers, value factor becomes insignificant. This is consistent with Fama and 
French (2015), who find that value factor becomes redundant when profitability and in-
vestment factors are included in the model. Especially the investment factor (CMA) is 
substantially positive and statistically significant for all the three loser strategies, which 
is consistent with Titman et al. (2004). The investment factor loading is highest for the 
high fundamental loser strategy and it varies between 0.493 and 0.511 between the 
loser strategies. This indicates that the past losers tend to make conservative invest-
ments in both high and low fundamental strength levels. 
 
The simple loser and the high fundamental loser strategies also have a positive and 
highly significant profitability factor loadings, being 0.394 for the latter, whereas the low 
fundamental losers have statistically insignificant profitability factor loading. Positive and 
statistically significant profitability exposure of the high fundamental loser strategy is 
consistent with previous research, as FSCORE works as a leading indicator of future prof-
itability (Piotroski, 2000; Piotroski & So, 2012). The loser strategies’ size factor exposures 
stay similar with the five-factor model, as the simple losers and the low fundamental 
losers have positive and highly significant loadings.  
 
From the winner strategies’ perspective, Table 8 shows that the low fundamental win-
ners still have positive and highly significant size factor exposure of 0.304, whereas for 
the high fundamental winners it is negative and statistically significant at level of 5%. 
Also, the simple winners and the high fundamental winners still have negative and sta-
tistically significant value factor loadings. The simple winner strategy also has a positive 
and highly statistically significant profitability exposure. Opposite to loser strategies, the 
simple winner and the high fundamental winner strategies have negative and statistically 
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significant investment factor loadings, therefore being more aggressive on the use of 
capital expenditures, which is also consistent with Titman et al. (2004). 
 
Adjusted R-squared in Table 8 shows, that the five-factor model explains the returns of 
the portfolios reasonably well. With an exception of the low fundamental winner strat-
egy, which has an adjusted R-squared of 46.1%, all the portfolios have an adjusted R-
squared above 50%, with the simple winner portfolio having the highest at 85.8%. The 
low fundamental winner strategy has the highest market exposure with the market beta 
of 1.172, whereas the simple loser strategy has the lowest with 1.055.  
 
Table 9 presents the results for the regressions with the six-factor model, which aug-
ments the five-factor model with momentum (UMD) factor. Adding momentum factor 
does not make significant changes to the big picture as there is only a slight increase in 
the adjusted R-squared for all but one strategies, as the simple loser’s adjusted R-
squared stays the same as with the five factor model. Similarly, the factor loadings do 
not have a significant change. 
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Table 9. Six-factor model loadings. 
 
  Simple loser Simple winner LF-L HF-L LF-W HF-W 
alpha 0.074 0.195 0.105 0.068 0.131 0.295 
 (0.551) (1.392) (0.416) (0.338) (0.376) (1.553) 
Market 1.057*** 1.093*** 1.124*** 1.133*** 1.209*** 1.128*** 
 (19.133) (21.004) (14.764) (16.305) (10.631) (17.212) 
SMB 0.189*** -0.078* 0.448*** 0.095 0.282*** -0.147** 
 (3.063) (-1.766) (5.743) (1.006) (2.708) (-2.085) 
HML 0.136* -0.310*** 0.184 0.156 -0.174 -0.339*** 
 (1.743) (-4.848) (1.647) (1.171) (-1.090) (-3.791) 
RMW 0.267*** 0.188*** 0.040 0.375*** 0.042 0.181* 
 (2.969) (3.037) (0.381) (2.978) (0.252) (1.875) 
CMA 0.494*** -0.280*** 0.517*** 0.482** -0.297 -0.338** 
 (4.030) (-2.625) (3.167) (2.245) (-0.949) (-2.197) 
UMD 0.009 -0.055 -0.069 0.085* 0.154 -0.113** 
 (0.223) (-1.497) (-0.752) (1.661) (1.495) (-2.430) 
       
Adj. R-Sqr. 0.783 0.860 0.646 0.586 0.467 0.759 
T-statistics are reported in the parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
As Table 9 shows, momentum is statistically significant for two strategies, the high fun-
damental losers and the high fundamental winners. The high fundamental losers have a 
slightly positive momentum exposure with a low magnitude and statistical significance 
of 10%. Interestingly, the high fundamental winners have a negative exposure of -0.113 
to momentum factor, being statistically significant at level of 5%. Although both momen-
tum and long-term reversals are past return-based phenomena, they occur in different 
time horizons and have opposing characteristics, which could explain the low momen-
tum exposure in the strategies presented in this study.  
 
Reviewing the chapter from the perspective of hypothesis H2, the results show that the 
returns of the fundamental reversal strategies are explained by the common risk factors. 
When using only the three-factor model to explain the returns, the high-fundamental 
losers have statistically significant monthly abnormal returns of 0.42%, which disappear 
when profitability and investment factors are added to the model. Therefore, the hy-
pothesis H2 is supported by the empirical results.  
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6 Conclusions 
This paper examines the relation between long-term return reversals and fundamental 
strength. Fundamental strength is measured using Piotroski’s (2000) FSCORE, which 
measures firms’ profitability, change in financial leverage/liquidity and change in opera-
tional efficiency. This study is motivated by the findings of Piotroski and So (2012), who 
find that value/growth-strategy’s returns are focused in portfolios with incongruent ex-
pectations implied by FSCORE and book-to-market multiples. In this study, long-term re-
turn reversals are expected to be stronger on high (low) fundamental strength portfolios 
with lowest (highest) past return performance, in which the future performance expec-
tations implied by past long-term returns are incongruent with current fundamentals. 
 
As hypothesized, long-term past losers with high fundamental strength have stronger 
reversals than losers with low fundamental strength. On the other hand, similar return 
reversals are not observed with past winners. The raw returns of the high fundamental 
losers are robust to excluding Januaries from the sample. Contrarily, annual raw returns 
of past losers with low fundamental strength decrease by approximately 1.50% when 
Januaries are excluded. On the other hand, the returns of all winner strategies increase 
when Januaries are excluded. Simple fundamental analysis with FSCORE can also help to 
enhance risk-adjusted performance measured with Sharpe (1966) and Sortino (1994) ra-
tios, as the high fundamental winners and losers have higher risk-adjusted returns than 
the low fundamental counterparts. The risk-adjusted returns of the high fundamental 
losers are also higher than the market but ultimately lose to the simple reversal strategy 
without FSCORE sorting. 
 
The returns of the fundamental reversal strategies are explained by common risk factors. 
When using only Fama and French (1996) three-factor model to explain the returns, the 
simple loser strategy without FSCORE sorting and the high fundamental loser strategy 
gain statistically significant and positive abnormal returns.  However, statistically signifi-
cant abnormal returns of all the strategies disappear when investment and profitability 
factors are added to the model. In factor loading level, the loser strategies are 
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characterized as having conservative capital expenditures, whereas the winner strate-
gies are characterized as being aggressive with capital expenditures, consistent with pre-
vious research by Titman et al. (2004). More specifically, the high fundamental loser 
strategy is characterized as containing profitable firms with conservative capital expend-
itures. Including momentum factor in the analysis with Fama and French (2018) six-factor 
model does not change the conclusions, as it does not have a significant exposure in the 
fundamental reversal strategies.  
 
Consistent with the findings in various frameworks, such as value/glamour (Piotroski & 
So, 2012; Walkshäusl, 2017), short-term return reversals (Zhu, Sun, & Chen, 2019), price 
momentum (Ahmed & Safdar, 2018; Walkshäusl, 2019), and unconditional high/low 
FSCORE-sorting (Ng & Shen, 2016; Turtle & Wang, 2017; Hyde, 2018), high FSCORE firms 
have better performance than low FSCORE firms within both past winners and losers, 
when considering the risk-adjusted performance. As the low fundamental strength win-
ners do not have systematical reversals, the reversal effect relies on the past losers with 
incongruent fundamentals. However, it is important to keep in mind, that making infer-
ences about the low fundamental strength winners is unreliable, as only a few firms with 
such a combination were found.  
 
Following the criticism by Fama (1998) and Hou et al. (2018) about using equal-weight 
returns in empirical studies, this study uses value-weight returns which can be mani-
fested as the lack of abnormal returns and more reliable results. On the other hand, one 
must be critical in interpreting the results of this study due to survivorship bias caused 
by the data collection methodology. Especially the returns of loser portfolios can be up-
wardly biased, as delisted companies are not included in the analysis. Additional re-
search could be done with larger data set without survivorship bias, which would also 
allow to have more extreme portfolio formations to see whether the returns are sensi-
tive to portfolio size in a similar fashion as with unconditional long-term reversals in the 
study by Galariotis (2012). Also, additional research could be done of the role of funda-
mental strength in the January effect, as past long-term losers with high fundamental 
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strength seem to have more robust returns than low fundamental counterparts when 
January returns are excluded, in a similar fashion as with the short-term monthly return 
reversals reported by Zhu et al. (2019). 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. Definitions of the financial performance signals of FSCORE 
Financial performance 
signal Definition Indicator variable 
Profitability     
ROA Net income before extraordinary items t / Total assets 
t-1 
If ROA > 0, then 
F_ROA equals 1, oth-
erwise 0 
CFO Cash flow from operations t / Total assets t-1 If CFO > 0, F_CFO 
equals 1, otherwise 0 
ΔROA Return on assets t  - Return on assets t-1 If ΔROA > 0, F_ΔROA 
equals 1, otherwise 0 
ACCRUAL (Net income before extraordinary items t  - Cash flow 
from operations t) / Total assets t-1 
If ACCRUAL < 0, 
F_ACCRUAL equals 1, 
otherwise 0 
Changes in financial 
leverage/liquidity 
  
ΔLEVER Total debt t / (Total assets t + Total assets t-1)/2 – Total 
debt t-1 / (Total assets t-1 + Total assets t-2)/2 
If ΔLEVER < 0, 
F_ΔLEVER equals 1, 
otherwise 0 
ΔLIQUID Current assets t  / Current liabilities t – Current assets t-
1 / Current liabilities t-1 
If ΔLIQUID > 0, 
F_ΔLIQUID equals 1, 
otherwise 0 
ISSUANCE Proceeds from sale/issuance of common equity in 
year t 
If ISSUANCE > 0, IS-
SUANCE equals 0, 
otherwise 1 
Operating efficiency   
ΔMARGIN (Net sales t – Cost of goods sold t)/Net sales t - (Net 
sales t-1 – Cost of goods sold t-1)/Net sales t-1 
If ΔMARGIN > 0, 
F_ΔMARGIN equals 
1, otherwise 0 
ΔTURN Net sales t / (Total assets t + Total assets t-1)/2 – Net 
sales t-1 / (Total assets t-1 + Total assets t-2)/2 
If ΔTURN > 0, 
F_ΔTURN equals 1, 
otherwise 0 
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Appendix 2. Year-to-year returns of the fundamental winner strategies 
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